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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Benjamin Franklin pondered1 “When will mankind be 
convinced and agree to settle their difficulties by arbitration?” he probably did 
not expect that after over 300 years of successful arbitration history2 
the world is still not convinced. The storm of protest from all 
quarters of society and all corners of the world in regard to the new 
investment arbitration chapters in the Trans Pacific Partnership 
Agreement3 and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership4 
suggest the opposite - a deep mistrust in at least one field of 
arbitration: international investment arbitration.5 An illustrative 
example is the editorial of Wellington’s Dominion Post6: 
                                                 
 1 DAVE FARNHAM, SNIPPETS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (2014). 
2 For an overview of arbitration history (even predating 300 years), see 
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1.01 (Kluwer, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2nd ed., 2014). 
3 Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS & 
TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-
process/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2016). 
4 Documents and events, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-
events/index_en.htm#_documents (last visited Apr. 2 2016). 
5 Leon E. Trakman, Investment Dispute Resolution under the Transpacific 
Partnership Agreement: Prelude to a Slippery Slope? (2013); Leon E. Trakman Investor-State 
Arbitration: Evaluating Australia’s Evolving Position (2011); Jess Hill, TPP clauses that let 
Australia be sued are weapons of legal destruction, says lawyers, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/10/tpps-clauses-that-let-
australia-be-sued-are-weapons-of-legal-destruction-says-lawyer (last accessed 4 May 
2016); George Monbiot, This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-
frontal-assault-on-democracy; The arbitration game; Investor-state dispute settlement, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014; Martin Khor, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPPA): When Foreign Investors Sue the State, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tppa-when-
foreign-investors-sue-the-state/5357500; Daniel Kalderimis, Investor/state arbitration, 
the TPP and New Zealand, CHAPMAN TRIPP (July 28, 2015), 
http://leanz.org.nz/uploads/presentations/Kalderimis_LEANZ%20Presentation_
280715.pdf; Bianca Mueller, The Devil in the TPPA – Investor State Dispute Settlement, 
SCOOP (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1503/S00196/the-
devil-in-the-tppa-investor-state-dispute-settlement.htm (last accessed 4 May 2016); 
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But the non-trade aspects of the deal are the most 
worrying. The worst is the mechanism allowing 
foreign companies to sue New Zealand in 
controversial offshore tribunals. This raises serious 
problems of sovereignty and fairness. 
These tribunals are not courts as we understand them. 
They are courts dedicated to the interests of investors, 
rather than countries. Appeals are very limited. 
Conflicts of interest among those on the tribunals are 
not rigorously controlled. Judgments are not required 
to be consistent. 
Responsibility for the public’s mistrust in investor-state 
arbitration lies partly with human rights lawyers’ and activists’ 
[“human rights lobby”] claims of lack of transparency, investor bias 
and the disregard of citizens’ human rights.7 The human rights lobby 
has painted the investors as the big bad wolves.  The state and its 
citizens are red riding hood and the arbitral tribunals, as the Brothers 
Grimm, are re-writing the happy end. The international arbitration 
profession, on the other hand, has shied away from a thorough 
engagement with human rights and seems to have a severe case of 
“Berührungsangst”.8  
                                                 
Julien Chaisse, The shifting tectonics of international investment law - structure and dynamics of 
rules and arbitration on foreign investment in the Asia-Pacific region, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 563 (2015). 
6 EDITORIAL: It’s too soon to celebrate the singing of this “free trade” deal, 
DOMINION POST, ed., Jan. 15, 2016.  
7 UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and investment 
agreements on human rights, UNITED NATIONS HOMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=160
31; Andrew Geddis, Of TPP’s, ISDS’s and the Constitution, PUNDIT (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://pundit.co.nz/content/of-tpps-isdss-and-the-constitution; Open Letter, TPP 
LEGAL, https://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/ (last accessed 4 May 2016).  
8 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 576 (2011); see also Ciaran Cross & Christian Schliemann-
Radbruch, When Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent 
Solutions through Amicus Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6 L. & DEV. REV. 
67, 87 (2013) (et seq. which show that arbitral tribunals have not taken the 
opportunity to clarify the role of human rights in investment arbitration); see also 
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The widespread absence of a discussion of investors’ rights 
by the human rights lobby and the general lack of willingness by the 
international arbitration community to engage with human rights 
issues is concerning.  It is concerning because, in particular for 
developing countries, sustainable economic development requires 
both: foreign direct investment and the protection of human rights.9  
The aim of this think piece is to provide a basis to fill the 
gaps in both discussions by firstly describing the international human 
rights framework and in particular discussing whether and which 
human rights are available to investors and a state’s citizens.  The 
paper will then examine how a human rights analysis is relevant in an 
investment arbitration and why there is no need for the investment 
arbitration community to have “Berührungsängste”. By doing so the 
paper proposes a framework that will allow for the consistent 
inclusion of the International Bill of Human Rights (“IBR”) and 
customary international human rights as a benchmark in investor-
state dispute settlement.  A consistent human rights benchmark is 
important since investor state dispute settlement can take place in 
competing jurisdictions, such as national courts, investment 
arbitration, regional human rights courts, or the International Court 
of Justice. There is therefore a need for promoting consistent human 
rights benchmarking among diverse national, regional and worldwide 
courts, and alternative dispute settlement proceedings.  
The paper is also a contribution against the fragmentation of 
international law.10 It is the thesis of this paper that the IBR and 
customary international human rights provide the international 
constitutional framework in which any investment treaty is situated 
and in which international arbitral tribunals have to operate. To 
                                                 
Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from 
within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107, 
1116 (2011). However, as an exception to the rule discussion of art 14 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see Hersham Talaat v. Indonesia, 
UNCITRAL (Dec. 14, 2015). 
9 See Megan Wells Scheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to 
Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 483 (2011). 
10 See Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in 
Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf. 
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illustrate the difference, the proposed framework will make to the 
discussion of investors’ rights versus citizens’ rights, the new 
framework will be applied to a case scenario. It is noteworthy to 
stress that the investment treaty perspective on human rights 
significance is not the main focus of this paper,11 albeit some 
reference will be made.12 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the 
birthrights of all human beings; their protection and 
promotion is the first responsibility of 
Governments.13 
There are several human rights frameworks which could be 
used to determine the citizens’ and the investor’s rights: particular 
domestic human rights frameworks, regional frameworks in some 
parts of the world, and the international human rights framework. 
The international human rights framework encompasses the IBR 
containing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and 
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”).14 As Stephen Gardbaum convincingly argues, the IBR 
has to be seen as part of the international constitutional order.15 It 
                                                 
11 See for very detailed discussion from the investment law perspective 
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 573 (2011); Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: A Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107 (2011); Vivian Kube & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
Human rights law in international investment arbitration, EUI Working Papers (Law 
2016/02). 
12 See below II.D. 
13 Vienna Declaration, sec. 1.  
14 Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf. 
15 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 749 (2008); see also Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 
55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51 (2006); see also, Andreas Paulus, The International Legal 
System as a Constitution in JEFFREY DUNOFF & JOEL TRACHTMAN, RULING THE 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
334 
specifies the limits on how governments treat people within their 
jurisdictions. It enshrines and clarifies the distinct normative basis for 
the protection of fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather 
than as rights of citizens. That means international human rights do 
not make a difference between nationals and foreigners. The human 
rights obligations contained in the ICCPR and ICESCR have erga 
omnes effect to the extent that they have acquired customary 
international law status.16 That means that those rights enshrined in 
the IBR are  applicable whether or not states are member states to 
the IBR or its parts.17 As a result, the IBR is  applicable in every 
country around the world as part of the international constitutional 
order,18 laying down a global human rights standard19 for every 
                                                 
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW & GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 
69 (CUP, Cambridge, 2009). 
16 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (8th ed., 2012); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unité de 
l’ordre juridique international in RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, vol. 297, 382-85 (2002); Erika de Wet, The International 
Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (2006); for IESCR, see U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. No. 
E/C.12/2001/10, para 16 (May 2001). Ernst Ulrich Petersmann states: “Human 
rights have thus become part also of the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations (Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice)” in Time for 
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European 
Integration Law for Global Integration Law, NYU INSTITUTES ON THE PARK, 
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/012301-05.html. 
17 Based on the global recognition of those rights as the essence of what 
somehow natural right to every human being belongs just by being born as one, 
those rights cannot leave out any single individual, regardless of their nationality. 
See Horst Dreier, in: Dreier (Hrsg.), GG, Bd. 1, 2. Aufl., 2004, Vorb. Rdn. 25, 
Gerhard Herdegen in Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 78. EL September 
2016, Art. 1 Abs. 2, marginal no. 31, 32, Herbert Bethge in Maunz/Schmidt-
Bleibtreu/Klein/Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 49. EL Juli 2016, 
BVerfGG Rn. 90, marginal no. 65. 
18 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 
THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008) (“international human rights law also 
functions to enshrine and clarify the distinct normative basis for the protection of 
fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather than as rights of citizens”). 
19 Compare with Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International 
Constitutional Rights, 19 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008); see also Lucas 
Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism 
at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 585 (2010).  
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human being notwithstanding whether they are a citizen or foreigner. 
The IBR provides the baseline global human rights protection.20 
Whether, or in which circumstances, (additional) human rights 
enshrined in regional and/or domestic human rights standards have 
to be taken into account in investor state dispute resolution, is not 
within the scope of this paper.  
How investment tribunals have to have regard to the IBR will 
be discussed under II.C.2. In the following the paper will outline the 
rights of the state’s citizens and that of the investor under the IBR.  
A. The Rights of the State Citizens  
The human rights lobby is claiming in particular the following 
rights as being jeopardized by investor state relationships and the 
resulting disputes: the right to health21, the right to water22, the right 
                                                 
20 As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann points out “Dictatorial governments can 
no longer freely ‘contract out’ of their human rights obligations by withdrawing 
from UN human rights covenants or ILO conventions” in Time for Integrating 
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European Integration 
Law for Global Integration Law, THE JEAN MONNET CENTER FOR INT’L AND REG. 
ECON. L. AND JUST., http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/012301-
05.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016) (That must be true not only for dictatorial 
governments but generally in regard to the inability of states to contract out of 
“human rights”).  
21 The IECSR Committee has interpreted the “right to health, as defined 
in article 12.1, as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate 
health care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe 
and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, 
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and 
access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and 
reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the 
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and 
international levels.” The right to health encompasses the control over one’s health 
and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from 
interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical 
treatment and experimentation; the right to a system of health protection which 
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of 
health, including, for example, access (non-discriminatory, economic, physical, 
information) to functioning public health and health-care facilities [ICESCR General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) 
Adopted at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
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to a sustainable or healthy environment23, the right of indigenous 
peoples to their ancestral lands24, and the right to development25 of 
                                                 
Cultural Rights, on Aug. 11, 2000 (Contained in Doc. E/C.12/2000/4), paras 8, 11, 
1). In regard to a comprehensive treatment of the right to health, see JOHN TOBIN, 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012) and VALENTINA VADI, 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 
(2012). 
22 The right to water encompasses, inter alia, sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. States 
need to take steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health from 
unsafe and toxic water conditions. General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water 
(Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), Adopted at the Twenty-ninth Session of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on Jan. 20, 2003 (Contained 
in Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 2, 8). With regard to a comprehensive treatment 
of the right to health, see EIBE RIEDEL & PETER ROTHEN, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
WATER (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006). 
23 The right encompasses the right to a non-polluted environment, which 
does not endanger health, life and development. The right also comprises the 
obligation of the state and the community of states to repair any damage done by 
pollution. Gheorghe Durac, Granting the Right to a Quality Environment -A Premise of 
Sustainable Development, 9 PESD 153, 154 (2015); John Lee, Underlying Legal Theory to 
Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary 
International Law, 25 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 283. (2000). For an overview of the 
protection of the environment in regional and domestic human rights instruments, 
see Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment, UNEP, 
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/
HumanRightsEnvironmentRev.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).  
24  UN Indigenous Peoples Declaration, Art 1(1): “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.” The central right is the right to 
the enjoyment of ancestral lands. Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating 
Indigenous Land Rights in International Investment Law, 6 J. OF INT’L INVESTMENT L., 
42; see generally  JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(OUP, 1996).  
25 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), Art 1(1): “The right 
to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” The Declaration in its 10 articles 
requires states to guarantee rights in a manner applicable to globalisation, ie it 
compels states to cooperate with each other to the best of their abilities and 
resources to achieve development throughout the world: see for a general 
discussion DANIEL AGUIRRE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A 
GLOBALISED WORLD (2008); Stephen Marks, Beate Rudolf, Koen De Feyter, & 
Nicolaas Schrijver, The role of international law in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN 
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the citizens in the particular country.26  Those citizens’ rights, the 
human rights claims, are given no weight by investment tribunals. 
Tribunals were only concerned with the rights of investors.  
The right to health and the right to water are enshrined in the 
IBR.27 Thus, human beings have a right to health and to water 
notwithstanding the country they live in. The right to a sustainable or 
healthy environment and the right to development did not find their 
way explicitly into the IBR. Today, both rights are afforded at least 
near close to customary international law status.28 The right of 
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands is protected by the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration is 
                                                 
RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN 
COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON 
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT  445, 454 (U.N. Publication, 2013). 
26 In regard to general criticism, see Investor State Dispute Settlement- The 
Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-
governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration; Claire 
Provost and Matt Kennard, The obscure legal system that allows corporations to sue countries, 
THE GUARDIAN, June 10, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-
corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid; Still not loving ISDS: 10 reasons to oppose investors’ 
super-rights in EU trade deals, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, July 14, 2014, 
http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2014/04/still-not-loving-isds-10-
reasons-oppose-investors-super-rights-eu-trade. 
27 ISECR Art 12, Art 11 (1); in addition, the U.N. General Assembly 
recognised the right to water and sanitation as a human right specifically in 
U.N.G.A. Res. 64/292, 64th Session A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010). 
28 For the right to a sustainable environment see John Lee, The Right to a 
Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283, 338 (2000); see Susan Glazebrook, 
Human Rights and the Environment, VUWLR: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC 293 
(2009); Prue Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in 
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (1997); For the right to 
development see Isabella Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International 
Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2000). It also should be noted 
that due to human rights law establishes a responsibility on part of the state toward 
those under its jurisdiction, and not solely an obligation between states, the 
Restatement has drawn a subtle distinction between the manner in which 
customary human rights law is established from that which creates customary 
international law in general. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 701 (1987), reporter’s note 2.  
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not binding law. The formulation of the rights therein, however, 
reflects emergent customary international law.29  
It is the nature of human rights law to create obligations on 
the part of the state towards those under its jurisdiction.  The IBR 
clearly stipulates states’ obligations, for example, Article 2 (1) of the 
ICESCR reads: 
[T]o take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.  
Article 2(1) of ICESCR compels the community of states to 
work towards attaining the best standard of health possible for its 
citizens. It also requires every state to make every effort to provide 
for sufficient clean water. Of particular interest are the states’ 
obligations in regard to the right to development. The right to 
development encapsulates a resonance of the core principles of all 
human rights including, primarily, equity, non-discrimination, active 
and meaningful participation, accountability and transparency.30 For 
the right to be effective, another core part of the right to 
development is that states have a duty by themselves, and in 
                                                 
29 Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land Rights in 
International Investment Law, 6 J. INT’L. INVESTMENT L. 42, 52 et seq. (2015); see also 
James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST.ORG (Oct. 3, 2007), 
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-
indigenous.php; In regard to the general application under the American 
Convention on Human Rights see, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System-Indigenous And Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural 
Resources, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://cidh.org/countryrep/Indigenous-Lands09/Chap.V-VI.htm (last visited Apr. 
16, 2016).  
30 See the reports of the Working Group on the Right to Development 
on its: Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/23, para. 43(a); Sixth session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/25, para. 42; Seventh Session E/CN.4/2006/26, paras. 31, 40, 
46, 67(g). 
2017 Butler 5:2 
339 
conjunction with the community of states, to accomplish the utmost 
possible within their available resources to attain the highest level of 
development in their respective states, but also globally.31 The same is 
true for the right to a sustainable and healthy environment.32  
Even though there is no unified global understanding of 
whether and how an individual can assert the right to health, water, a 
healthy environment, and a right to development (which are 
categorized as second and third generation rights33), there is no doubt 
that in regard to those rights it is the state’s and the community of 
states’ obligation to constantly work towards the highest fulfillment 
and execution of those rights for its citizens and the global citizenry.  
The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral land is 
different to the other rights discussed as it is first and foremost a 
negative right.  It obligates the states which are the home of 
indigenous peoples to provide them with the protection not to be 
deprived of their land.34 It does not compel the particular state to 
                                                 
31 Ibrahim Salama, The right to development at 25: renewal and achievement of its 
potential, in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE 
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 485, 486 
(2013 ). 
32 John Lee, The Right to a Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
283, 338 (2000); see also Draft Declaration on Human Rights and the Environment, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I (1994), art. 22 (“All States shall 
respect and ensure the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound 
environment. Accordingly, they shall adopt the administrative, legislative and other 
measures necessary to effectively implement the rights in this Declaration”). 
33 See PAUL O’CONNELL, VINDICATION SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES (2012); HELENA 
ALVIAR GARCIA, KARL KLARE, & LUCY WILLIAMS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES (2015).  
34 Compare Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinam, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 25, 
2015), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_309_esp.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2016) (The ACtHR found that Suriname had violated Art 3 ACHR 
by failing to recognize the collective legal personality asserted by the indigenous 
and tribal people in this case. It further noted that the lack of demarcation, 
delimitation, and failure to award legal title of the territory of Kaliña and Lokono 
violated the villagers’ collective right to property recognized under Art 21 ACHR), 
The Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 148, paras. 169-200 (July 1, 2006) (The 
Court concluded that the State violated Article 21 (right to property) to the 
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progressively attain their ancestral land nor does the right require 
states to work as the community of states to attain those rights.  
In summary, the human rights at play on the side of citizens 
are the right to health, water, a healthy environment, and the right to 
development. It is generally recognized that in regard to those rights, 
states have the obligation to safeguard their citizens against human 
rights abuses, including those of (transnational) corporations.35 In 
particular, they are commissioned to work as part of the community 
of states towards the highest possible attainment of the fulfillment of 
those rights. The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands 
has been conceptualized as a negative right, thought of as rooted in 
the right to property. Its justiciability is unquestioned.36  
B. The Right of the Investor  
 1. Legal Persons as Human Rights Bearers  
Human rights are generally conceptualized as a safeguard for 
the individual against the state. If the investor is an individual there is 
no doubt human rights will extend to the investor.37  However, the 
                                                 
detriment of the fifty-nine victims because its agents collaborated with the 
paramilitary group to destroy the victims’ homes and steal their livestock, 
unlawfully depriving them of their property.). 
35 Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/4/035, para. 19 (Feb. 19, 2007) (prepared by John Ruggie): “..the state 
duty to protect against non state abuses is part of the international human rights 
regime’s very foundation. The duty requires states to play a key role in regulating 
and adjudicating abuse by business enterprises or risk breaching their international 
obligations.” 
36 E.g., Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinami, supra note 34; Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, para. 113(a) (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 125, para 157(c) (June 17, 2005). 
37 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 170 (Nov. 21, 2007),  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last visited 
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extension of human rights protections to legal persons is less clear. 
The IBR does not afford legal persons38 protection.39 The exclusion 
of legal persons from the scope of the IBR, however, does not 
necessarily follow from the IBR’s purpose.40 It does correspond to 
the preamble though, which asserts that human rights derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person, and with the intention of 
its drafters.41 
Looking more regionally, the Inter American Convention of 
Human Rights (“ACHR”) does not offer rights protection to legal 
persons either.42  On the other hand, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”)43 and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”)44 have extended rights protection, at least 
in part, to legal persons.45  
                                                 
May 10, 2016) (The individual investors were imprisoned and their property seized 
due to being suspected of drug trafficking.). 
38 The term “legal person” is used for the purposes of this paper in a 
rather broad sense, as including all natural entities.  
39 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature 
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 9 (Mar. 29, 2004).  
40 Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global 
Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 24-25 (1999).   
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights preamble reads “Whereas 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world,…”; see also Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping 
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/035, para. 37 (Feb. 19, 2007).  
42 ACHR, Art. 61(1); ACHR, Art. 1(2); Cantos v. Argentina, Preliminary 
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 22 et seq. (Sept. 7, 2001); Perozo v. 
Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R., paras. 74, 399 (Jan. 28, 2009).   
43 ECHR, Art 34; see, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 37971/97, para. 41 (Apr. 16, 2002) (right to privacy in Art 8 ECHR).    
44  Art. 19 v. The State of Eritrea, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n. 
on Human and People’s Rights 275/ 2003 (May 2007); Civil Liberties Organization 
v. Nigeria, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n. on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
101/93, para 37 (1995).  
45 For a full discussion on the protection of legal persons under 
international and regional human rights instruments albeit in regard to their 
criminal liability, see Piet Hein Van Kempen, The Recognition of Legal Persons in 
International Human Rights Instruments: Protection Against and Through Criminal Justice?, in 
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There is recognition that legal persons, in particular 
transnational or multinational companies, should be the bearer of 
(international) human rights.46 That recognition is anchored in the 
fact that two regional human rights instruments afford human rights 
protection to legal persons and that human rights duties of 
transnational corporations have developed through soft-law 
mechanisms, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights 
and Business47 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.48 Those soft law instruments contain express provisions 
on the human rights responsibilities of transnational corporations.49 
However, efforts are under way to convert those soft law instruments 
into legally enforceable standards. In 2014 the Human Rights Council 
with Resolution 26/9 established a working group which is tasked to 
develop an international legally binding instrument to regulate the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
in regard to human rights.50 The Resolution clearly identifies the 
responsibility of transnational corporations and businesses to respect 
human rights.51 The European Union has directed that its member 
states implement the UN Guiding Principles through national action 
                                                 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK, 9, 
355 (Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory, 2011).  
46 See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015); see also Louis Henkin, The Universal 
Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17 (1999). 
47 Guiding Principles On Business And Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_
EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) 
48 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD, 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).  
49 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Principle 17; 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Recommendations for 
Responsible Business Conduct in a Global Context, Part I, Chap IV Human 
Rights, No 5 (May 25, 2011).  
50 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 
(July 14, 2014),  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnT
NC.aspx (last accessed April 17, 2016).  
51 Id.  
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plans and has incorporated the Principles in its external policy.52 The 
(growing) responsibility of transnational companies in regard to the 
implementation of human rights must go hand in hand with their 
right of being protected by human rights. In other words, the human 
rights lobby cannot have their cake and eat it, too.53  
 2. A legal person’s human rights 
(i) General introduction 
It is nearly trite to state that not every human right is 
applicable to legal persons. The IBR rights that could be applicable to 
legal persons are, inter alia, freedom of expression54, freedom from 
discrimination55, the right to freedom of movement, access to 
justice56, fair trial rights57, or the right not to be searched 
                                                 
52 European Commission,  Commission Staff Working Document on 
Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - State of Play, 
SWD, 144 final (July 14, 2015).  
53 See H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra note 50 (acknowledging the double role of 
transnational corporations and other business as having “the capacity to foster 
economic well-being, development, technological improvement and wealth, as well 
as causing adverse impacts on human rights”). 
54 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
6538/74 (1979); Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria (no. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 39069/97 (2003); Matter of the “Golobvision” Television Station, 
Provisional Measure Regarding Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 21, 2007).  
55 Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No 
18147/02 (Apr. 5, 2007); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. App. No. 72881/01 (Oct. 5, 2006); also compare Alexkor Ltd. and Another v. 
The Richtersveld Community and Others, S. Afr. S.C. (2003).  
56 Access to justice encompasses the notion of denial of justice. Denial of 
justice has been recognised as jus cogens independent from being a right contained, 
as an aspect of access to justice, in the IBR. See Chevron Corporation (USA) and 
Texaco Petroleum Corporation (USA) v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, at 
2-3 (Dec. 1, 2008). 
57 British-American Tobacco Company v. the Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 19589/91 (Nov. 20, 1995); Central Mediterranean Development 
Corporation Ltd. v. Malta (no. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 18544/08 (Nov. 22,  
2011); Mevopal SA v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 39/99 (Mar. 
11, 1999).  
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unreasonably.58 The probably most important right for any investor 
is, however, the right to property.59 The right to property is only 
protected in the UDHR60; it is not directly protected in the ICCPR or 
ICESR.61 Until recently, it was general opinion that a right to 
property could only arise under national law.62 However, sweeping 
economic and political changes in recent decades have laid the 
foundation for recognizing a global right to property. The ideological 
opposition against property rights has disappeared with China, 
Russia, and other socialist states having transitioned to market 
economies which are premised on private property. In addition, the 
globalization of trade has enhanced international support for 
protecting property rights. Furthermore, the increasing recognition of 
(property) rights of indigenous people has also aided a change in 
                                                 
58 See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015), for an in-depth comparative 
discussion.   
59 “And while one could argue that human rights treaties are 
fundamentally different from investment treaties with regard to their purpose of 
the protection of individuals compared to the promotion of friendly economic 
relations between two states, it should not be forgotten that a fundamental investor 
right under investment treaties is the right to property, which is itself a human 
right, recognized in most international human rights conventions.” HELGE 
ELISABETH ZEITLER, in STEPHAN W. SCHILL (ed.), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 199 et seq. 
60 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/810, Art. 17 (1948) (“(1) [e]veryone has the right to own property alone as 
well as in association with others” and “(2) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property”). 
61 Eibe Riedel in THEORIE DER MENSCHENRECHTSSTANDARDS 39 
(Dunker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986) concludes that the travaux préparatoires 
indicate that the non-inclusion of property rights in both Covenants originates in 
the antagonistic ideological views of the Western and Eastern blocs, as well as 
those of the North and South. See also John Sparkling, The Global Right to Property, 52 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 464, 469 (2014); Jacob Mchangama, The Right to Property 
in Global Human Rights Law, Cato Policy Report (Washington, June/July 2011), 
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/mayjune-2011/right-property-global-human-
rights-law (last accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (article maintains a certain political angle). 
62  Sparkling, supra note 61, at 464; see also Luis Valencia Rodriguez, The 
Right of Everyone to Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others, 90 U.N. 
Comm’n on H.R., UN Doc E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993).  
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finding that property is a customary human right.63 The three regional 
human rights treaties (the ECHR, the ACHPR, and the ACHR) all 
protect property.64 National constitutions and national laws 
overwhelmingly protect the right to property.65 Importantly, even 
though the right to property was not included in the ICCPR or the 
ICESCR the omission did not equate with the states’ denial of the 
right to property. As the Annotation to the Draft International 
Covenant on Human Rights clearly declares, “no one questioned the 
right of the individual to own property”.66 A close reading of the 
travaux préparatoires aids the conclusion that since the ideological 
obstacles in regard to property ownership have been “overcome”, a 
redrafted 2016 IBR would include the right to property; it would not 
only exist as a principle in the UDHR.67 Therefore, as Golay and 
Cismas conclude:68  
                                                 
63 In regard to the European Union countries, see: Case C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
European Commission, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, at 355.  
64 Eur. Ct. H.R. Optional Protocol No. 1, art 1; African [Banjul] Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982), Art. 21; American Convention on Human Rights, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, art 
21. That means that 2/3 of all nations are parties to regional human rights treaties 
that contain the right to property.  
65 In regard to extensive discussions on the protection of the right to 
property under national constitutions, see: THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN 
RIGHT TO PROPERTY 139-46 (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002). See also TOM ALLAN, 
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONS 36-82(CUP, 
Cambridge, 2000); Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as 
well as in association with others, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19, at 64 et seq. (Nov. 25, 
1993); Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human Rights 
Perspective, International Center for Human Rights and Democractic Development, 
at 2.3 (legal opinion, 2010), http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2016).  
66 See U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.230-232; E/CN.4/SR.302, 303; 
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 197, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A-
2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016). See also the concern expressed in U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 198 (“To omit [the right to property] might create the 
impression that it was not a fundamental human right”). 
67 U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.230-232; E/CN.4/SR.302, 303; 
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 197-212, available at 
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The review of provisions of international instruments, 
regional treaties and national constitutions reveal the universal 
recognition of the human right to property. It appears that 
generalized and consistent State practice and opinio juris reflect the 
customary nature of the first paragraph of Article 17 of the UDHR 
‘everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others’”.  
(ii) The ambit of the right to property 
An important question is what the right to property entails. 
Any attempt to discuss the ambit of the right to property in a 
comprehensive manner would go well beyond the scope of this 
article.69 The following sets out the basic features of the ambit of the 
right to property.  
The UN General Assembly has stated that the right to 
property extends to both “[p]ersonal property, including the 
residence of one’s self and family”70 and “[e]conomically productive 
property, including property associated with agriculture, commerce 
                                                 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A-
2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016). 
68 Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human 
Rights Perspective, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development, at 2.4 (legal opinion, 2010 ) http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18, 
2016); see also Sparkling, supra note 61, who extensively and detailed discusses the 
right to property as a right recognized as international law. Denying the jus cogens 
quality of the right to property, Joern Axel Kaemmerer, Der Schutz des Eigentums im 
Voelkerrecht, (Apr. 20, 2016) (denying the jus cogens quality of the right to 
property), https://www.uni-
trier.de/fileadmin/fb5/inst/IRP/Bitburger_Gespraeche_Einzeldokumente/Bitbur
gerGespr_2004_I_Kaemmerer_151_175_geschuetzt.pdf.  
69 See, e.g., URSULA KRIEBAUM, EIGENTUMSSCHUTZ IM VOELKERRECHT 
(Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 2008); THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT 
TO PROPERTY (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002); RUDOLF DOLZER, EIGENTUM, 
ENTEIGNUNG UND ENTSCHÄDIGUNG IM GELTENDEN VÖLKERRECHT (Springer, 
Heidelberg, 1985); Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 6 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 1-20 (1965); generally, FRIEDRICH CARL V. SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES 
BESITZES (Heyer, Gießen, 1803). 
70 U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98, para. 3 (Dec. 14 1990).  
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and industry”71  In the absence of the right to property being 
stipulated by the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has not dealt 
with the right directly.72 The Inter American Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, have 
filled the relative void under the respective Covenants.73 According to 
their jurisprudence, the right to property encompasses a wide range 
of economic interests like movable and immovable property; tangible 
and intangible interests, such as shares, an arbitration award and 
intellectual property;74 pension rights75; a business operation76; a 
customer base77; vested, asset like, rights78; a license or concession79; 
and the right to exercise a profession80  
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 The Human Rights Committee dealt with the right to property in the 
negative. E.g., Kéténguéré Ackla v. Togo, Communication No. 505/1992, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/505/1992, 1996, para. 6.3 (“the Committee noted that, 
irrespective of the fact that the confiscation took place prior to the date of entry 
into force of the Optional Protocol for Togo, the right to property was not 
protected by the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee decided that this claim was 
inadmissible ratione materiae, under article 3 of the Optional Protocol”). 
73 In regard to an overview of the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights, see: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of 
Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the 
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVIR. L. J. 148 (2012); in regard to the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: LAURENCE 
BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (OUP, Oxford, 2011).  
74 Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 1986 ECHR 8 (1986); Ivcher Bronstein 
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://wwwl 
.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/74-ing.html; Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, (ser. C) No. 135, para. 96 (Nov. 22, 2005); Salvador 
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections and Merits, (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6, 
2008). 
75 Azinas v. Cyprus, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 56679/00 (Apr. 28, 2004); 
Torres Benvenuto et al v. Peru (Five Pensioners Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
98 (Feb. 28, 2003); Acevedo Buendía et al (Discharged and Retired Employees of the 
Office of the Comptroller) v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, para. 80–91 (July 1, 2009). 
76 Van Marle v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8543/79; 8674/79; 
8675/79; 8685/79 (June 26, 1986) 
77 Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96, ECHR 1999-II 
75 (Mar. 25, 1999).  
78 Holy Monastries v. Greece,  Eur. Ct. H.R., 20 EHHR 1 (1995). 
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Importantly the ECHR has extended the concept of 
protected property to rights arising from contracts and other types of 
claims81, including, for example, claims to restitution under national 
law82  Furthermore, the Court has held that a legitimate expectation 
of a property right is protected under Article 1(1) Optional Protocol 
to the ECHR. In Slivenko v Latvia the Court stated:83  
[p]ossessions” can be “existing possessions” or assets, 
including claims by virtue of which the applicant can 
argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate 
expectation” of acquiring effective enjoyment of a 
property right. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has summarized 
the right to property as84  
                                                 
79 Tre Traktörer AB Garamond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., A159, para. 53 
(1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., 13 EHRR 784 (Feb. 18, 2991). 
80 Gospodinova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Comm’n H.R. App. No. 37912/97 
(Apr. 16, 1998) (decision on admissibility); Jantner v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 39050/97, para. 34 (Mar. 4, 2003); Kopecký v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 44912/98 (GC) 2004-IX, para. 35 (2004); von Maltzan et al v. Germany, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. App. No. 71916/01, 71917/01, 10260/02, para. 74 (Mar. 2 2005) (decision 
on admissibility).  
81 Compare, e.g., Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
21 EHHR 301 (1995) (tort claim); Monica Carss-Frisk, A guide to the implementation of 
Artice 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights 
Handbooks, No. 4, para. 29 et seq. (Strasbourg, 2001). 
82 Compare, e.g., Kirilova and Others v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
42908/98 et al: (June 9, 2005) (final, Sept. 9 2005), and (June 14, 2007) (final, Sept. 
14, 2007). 
83 Slivenko and Others v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99, (GC) 
ECHR 2002-II, para. 121 (2002); see also, Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 8919/80 (ser. A) 70, para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd.  v. 
Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) 222 (1991).  
84 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 
Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para. 144; see also, Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (June 17, 2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 29, 2006); Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007).  
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those material things which can be possessed, as well 
as any right which may be part of a person’s 
patrimony; that concept includes all moveables and 
immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and 
any other intangible object capable of having value. 
What is not protected is the right or guarantee to acquire 
property in the future.85 
It is undisputed that the right to property protects the right’s 
bearer from the direct expropriation of their property.86 Right’s 
bearers are also protected from a de facto deprivation of property.87 
As the ECHR observed:88 
In the absence of formal expropriation, that is to say a 
transfer of ownership, the Court considers that it 
must look behind the appearances and investigate the 
realities of the situation complained of . . . Since the 
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are 
“practical and effective” . . . it has to be ascertained 
whether th[e] situation amount[s] to a de facto 
expropriation…. 
(iii) Summary  
In the present day, not only individual investors but also 
corporations have to be afforded human rights. The inclusion of 
(transnational) legal persons in the protection sphere of international 
human rights has to be the consequence of requiring corporations to 
                                                 
85 Marckx v. Belgium,  Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6833/74 (1979); X v. the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8410/78 (1979).  
86 Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in 
Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 748 (Zurich, 
2007), available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf (last 
accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (p. 5 of the linked publication) 
87 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 7152/75 
(1982); Monica Carss-Frisk, supra note 81, para. 67 et seq.  
88 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, supra note 87, para. 63.  
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be protectors of human rights. The most important right for an 
investor, the right to property, has attained customary international 
law status. At this point in time the ambit of the right has to be 
ascertained through the analysis of (especially) the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter American Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence. Such an analysis reveals that the right to property 
extensively protects the economic interests of corporations in regard 
to direct, and importantly also de facto expropriation, and the 
curtailment of the use and enjoyment of their property.89 The right to 
property protects the physical assets of a corporation but also its 
intangible assets. Importantly, the right to property also protects the 
business operation including legitimate expectations.  
 3. Conclusion 
Both citizens as well as investors are afforded rights under 
international human rights law. However, at this point in time the 
state’s citizens’ enjoyment of human rights is on more solid 
foundations than those of legal persons in general and investors in 
particular. Citizens’ rights most likely to be at stake in an investor-
state dispute are so called second and third generation rights. Those 
rights are enshrined in the ICESCR or rights which have attained 
customary international law status. Even though generally their 
justiciability is not without doubt, it is generally accepted that those 
rights demand a constant progressive realization from states.90 For 
most investors, their human rights protection will depend on the 
acknowledgment that they can, as legal persons, be bearers of 
international human rights, in particular the IBR. Since 
(transnational) corporations are relied upon for the progressive 
realization of human rights, those obligations must come with the 
right to be a human rights bearer. A number of rights which have 
                                                 
89 See European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet: Companies-Victims or 
Culprits (July 2013); Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, supra note 86 
(discussing the differences between investment law and human rights law in regard 
to the issues arising in the limitation of the investor’s economic interest. However, 
the different treatment does not necessitates a different outcome in regard to 
protection).  
90 See above II.A. in regard to the concept of the states’ duty to 
progressive realization.  
2017 Butler 5:2 
351 
been or could be the focus of human rights violations by the state are 
ICCPR rights which are unquestionably justiciable. The right to 
property, which is undoubtedly the most important right to be 
upheld for the investor, has come into its own and has achieved at 
least near customary international law status. Therefore, international 
human rights law does afford investors protection in regard to the 
investment they have made.  
No human rights bearer, however, holds their rights 
absolutely. Article 29(2) of the UDHR generally acknowledges that, 
in the exercise of  
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society.  
Some rights in the IBR have specific limitations.91 Whether 
specific limitations apply to the right to property is at this point in 
time not generally recognized since the right to property has just 
emerged on the international plane. Guidance can again be sought 
from the ECHR and the ACHR. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol 
No 1 to the ECHR92 grants the state the possibility to limit the 
individual’s right to property due to public interest. The ACHR also 
allows the limitation of the right to property due to public interest. 
                                                 
91 The right to freedom of expression (art. 19(2), ICCPR), for example, 
can be limited when it is necessary for the country’s national security (art. 19(3)(b)).  
92 Optional Protocol No 1, Art. 1 reads: “Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such 
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.” See  Yukos v. Russia, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14902/04, 
para. 554 (Sept. 20, 2011), in regard to the general interpretation of Art. 1. 
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The ACHR only allows a limitation to the right to property for just 
compensation.93  
The citizen’s rights in question are rights that require a 
progressive realization by the state.94 To justify preventing the 
realization of one right at the expense of another right, the realization 
must be reasonable.95 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss 
the limitations on the right to property and the citizen’s rights at any 
length. For the purpose of this article it is important to state that 
neither the investor’s rights nor those of the citizens are absolute. 
Human rights law has developed internal limitation mechanisms to 
take account of the fact that the individual’s enjoyment of rights take 
place within the community of other rights holders.  
In addition to internally accepted limitations on a right, the 
commonly used analytical framework to balance the rights of human 
                                                 
93 ACHR, Art. 21(2) : “No one shall be deprived of his property except 
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, 
and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.” In Salvador 
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6, 2008), the city 
had expropriated applicant’s land for use as a public park but failed to pay any 
compensation. The Court held that the public interest or social utility standard was 
satisfied since the park provided a recreational and ecological protected area for the 
benefit of city residents. However, the Court found a violation of the right to 
property due to the city’s failure to comply with expropriation procedures required 
under domestic law (i.e., failure to pay compensation). The Court also observed that 
a restriction on the right to property must be proportionate to the legitimate 
interest that justifies it, which requires a fair balance between the interests of the 
public and owner. The ECtHR also generally requires compensation for a 
limitation of the right to property. James et al v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
App. No. 8793/79 (ser. A) No. 98, para. 54 (Feb. 21, 1986) (“[T]he taking of 
property in the public interest without payment of compensation is treated as 
justifiable only in exceptional circumstances not relevant for present purposes”); 
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 9006/80 et 
al., para. 120 (July 8, 1986) (“[T]he taking of property in the public interest without 
payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in exceptional 
circumstances”).. 
94 See above II.B.2.(i). 
95 The principle of reasonableness as an inherent limit of socio-economic 
rights has been best developed by the South African Constitutional Court, see 
Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (Mar. 4, 2004); see 
also, Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitation Clause, 20 
S. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 448 (2004). 
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rights holders to allow for the fullest human rights fulfillment is 
proportionality. Proportionality has been received inter alia into the 
constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe96, the United 
Kingdom97, Canada98, New Zealand99, Israel100, South Africa101, and 
the United States102, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal 
systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights103, the 
American Convention on Human Rights,104  the European Court of 
Justice,105 and the ICCPR106107 The core proportionality analysis 
requires the following inquiries to be made:  
a) Is there a legitimate aim in regard to the measure in 
question?  
b) Is the measure suitable to achieve the aim? 
                                                 
96 E.g., Bundesverfasungsgericht 1 BvR 2378/98 (Mar. 3, 2004) (police 
surveillance powers in regard to living space). 
97 R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 
26; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; 
Kashmiri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11. 
98 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
99 R v. Hansen [2007] N.Z.S.C. 7, para. 102 (N.Z.).  
100 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village  
49(4) PD 221, 353 (1995) (Isr.). 
101 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
102 In regard to the United States, see Iddo Porat, Mapping the American 
Debate over Balancing in GRANT HUSCROFT/BRADLEY MILLER/GREGOIRE WEBBER, 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 397 (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).  
103 Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., [1976] ECHR 5 (Dec. 
7, 1976); Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., 11 EHRR 439 (1989); Helene 
Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of 
Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the Property of Foreign Investors (2002) 11 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 148, 163 (2002).  
104 Compare IACHR, Art. 27(1) and discussion in YUTAKA ARAI-
TAKASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 186 (intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2001).  
105 E.g., Sky Österreich, E.C.J. (GC) C-283/11, para. 50 et seq. (Jan. 22, 
2013).  
106 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, para. 6 
(Mar. 29, 2004).  
107 For an in depth discussion on the framework of proportionality in 
different jurisdictions, see GRANT HUSCROFT, BRADLEY MILLER and GREGOIRE 
WEBBER, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).  
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c) Is the measure necessary to achieve the aim? 
d) Is the measure the least rights infringing means to 
achieve the aim? 
e) Considering the competing interests of the different 
rights bearers at hand is the measure proportional? 
The human rights framework demands a balancing of the 
investor’s rights with the rights of the citizens, i.e. the state’s right to 
make public policy decisions to safeguard its citizens’ rights. The 
human rights framework internally limits a state’s measure in regard 
to the realization of the rights in question, like the right to health or 
water. The proportionality paradigm gives the balancing a tested 
structure. It is therefore curious that a review of arbitral awards 
reveals that arbitral tribunals have turned a blind eye to the human 
rights of the state’s citizens, as an extensive study by Jason Fry 
determined.108 The argument generally advanced is that the arbitral 
tribunal gets its power by virtue of the parties set out in an 
investment treaty between the host state and the investor’s state. And 
as long as the investment treaty does not stipulate an authority for the 
investment tribunal to have regard to the citizens’ human rights, 
tribunals do not have the authority to do so.109 That has resulted in, 
as Bruno Simma put it:110  
a problem of aiming at two moving targets: for the 
foreign investor, how to accurately estimate the 
political risks of the investment before, or at the time 
of, its establishment in the host State so as to enable 
the investor to price the contract cost correctly 
according to its projected returns on investment; and 
for the host State, how to determine the optimal 
degree of police powers and regulatory authority to be 
retained during the life of the investment, needed to 
perform its international human rights obligations. 
                                                 
108 Jason Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: 
Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 77 (2007).  
109 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human 
Rights?, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 582 (2011). 
110 Id. at 579.  
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The non-use of the human rights framework by arbitral 
tribunals is problematic. The reason is that the right which is at the 
heart of investment arbitration – the right to access to justice – is the 
right which puts the investor, at least sometimes, in a better position 
than a state’s citizens. In a country with a non-functioning 
adjudication system111 the investors, unlike the citizens, have through 
investor-state arbitration an avenue open to them that allows access 
to justice to independent adjudicators who are outside that non-
functioning adjudication system. In this inequality lies the potential 
human rights violation of investor-state arbitration but also the 
potential for investor-state arbitration.  
C. International Arbitration Approaches  
Having set out the human rights framework applicable to the 
investor-state relationship the paper will briefly set out the currently 
proposed approaches of how tribunals can be compelled to take 
human rights into account.  
 1. Current Approaches  
Broadly speaking three approaches are advanced. All 
approaches are centered on the investment treaty. They have as their 
underlying premise that human rights can only be taken into account 
if, and as far as, an investment tribunal is allowed to consider rules of 
international law. They allow any kind of human rights analysis only 
in so far as human rights can be placed in a particular relationship 
with the investment treaty concerned.112 The core premise of those 
approaches is illustrated by the travaux prepartoires of Article 42(1) of 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID 
Convention) which refers to “such rules of international law as may 
be agreed by the parties.”113 
 
 
                                                 
111 “non- functioning” for the purposes of this article is meant in the 
widest sense including a legal system that does grant effective justice.  
112 See Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 581-82.  
113 ICSID Report of the Executive Directors, I ICSID Rep. 31 (2006) 
(emphasis added) (cited in CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
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(i) Explicit Referencing Approach 
The first approach advanced is to draft (in the future) 
investment treaties that clearly state that a tribunal has to take the 
state’s human rights commitments into account.114 Among the rare 
investment treaties that do make reference to human rights already, 
human rights are addressed in two different ways none of which 
gives the tribunal an explicit mandate to incorporate a human rights 
analysis into its decision making process. First, certain treaty clauses, 
such as Article 1114(1) of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), allow a host state under its respective regimes 
to enact measures aimed at protecting human rights.115 However, 
such measures are only allowed to the extent that they are consistent 
with the terms of the investment treaty.116 Second, other treaty 
clauses provide that the provisions of the investment treaty do not 
limit the regulatory power of states regarding the protection of 
human rights. Article 10(1) of the Canadian BIT Model provides 
such an example.
117
 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
                                                 
COMMENTARY 609 (CUP, Cambridge, 2001)). Pursuant to the report by the 
Executive Directors, the term ‘international law’ as used in the context of the 
Convention has to be understood in the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. In light of this statement, the 
applicable rules of international law are those contained in treaties, customary law, 
and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Therefore, under the 
ICSID Convention the IBR has to be taken into account if the investment treaty 
makes reference to international law.  
114 Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 579. 
115 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 
1114(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  
116  NAFTA, art 1114(1) (“Nothing in this Chapter [11] shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concern”) (emphasis added).  
117 Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
art. 10(1) (2004): “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
investments or between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade 
or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.” Available at 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf  (last 
accessed 3 April 2016); see also the Norwegian Draft Model BIT (2015), which has 
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Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union as a 
recent instance includes a clause which protects human rights 
explicitly.
118
 Those express references to the state’s ability to regulate 
with the aim to foster human rights are stating the obvious. As set 
out in the previous part of this paper states are compelled by the IBR 
to attain the highest standard in human rights compliance for their 
citizens. A reminder of that in an investment treaty is undoubtedly 
useful. In addition what is proposed is to clearly state in an 
investment treaty a tribunal’s ability to weigh the state’s aim to foster 
human rights compliance through its social and economic policy 
against the investor’s right to its investment.  
In regard to existing investment treaties two approaches have 
been proposed:  
(ii) Dynamic Interpretation Approach 
The first approach promulgates a dynamic interpretation as 
set out by the International Court of Justice in Kasiliki, Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v Namibia):119 where treaties use known legal terms whose 
content the parties expected would change through time,120 the 
meaning of these terms will be determined by reference to 
international law as it has evolved and stands at present, rather than 
to the state of the law at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.121 
                                                 
an equivalent to art. 10 in its art. 25. In addition, art. 31 reads: “The Parties agree to 
encourage investors to conduct their investment activities in  
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the United 
Nations Global Compact.” 
118 Consolidated Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Text, 
EU-Canada, Oct. 30, 2016, Annex 8-E (“. . . . the Parties confirm their 
understanding that measures that are ‘related to the maintenance of international 
peace and security’ include the protection of human rights”), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
119 Kasiliki, Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 
Rep. 1045. 
120 Id. at 2 (Declaration of Judge Rosalyn Higgins).  
121 The same technic was utilized in Ronald Lauder v. Czech Republic, 
Final Award of Sept. 3, 2001, at para. 200, 
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The European Court of Human Rights applies this principle as a 
matter of routine, basing it inter alia on articles 31(1) and 31(2) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.122   
(iii) Interpretative Presumption Approach 
The other school of thought emphasizes the interpretative 
presumption that treaties are intended to produce effects which 
accord with existing rules of international law.123 This presumption is 
used to resolve issues of interpretation relating to the broader 
normative content of a treaty rather than to the meaning of a specific 
term. This argument is based on article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties124  which states that in the 
interpretation of a treaty between the parties has to take account of 
“[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.” However, as Bruno Simma points out article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention can only be employed as a means 
of harmonization qua interpretation, and not for the purpose of 
modification, of an existing treaty.  
 2. The Human Rights Centric Approach 
However, is the Vienna Convention on Treaties really the 
glue that prevents international law to disintegrate into a 1000 pieces? 
In domestic law the respective constitution (generally containing a 
human rights catalogue) is allowed comfortably to be the overarching 
umbrella that gives the law legitimacy and provides a framework in 
what the state but also its citizens can engage in and are allowed to 
                                                 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
122 See, e.g., SE Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No 
4451/70, Report of the Commission, CE doc. D-60-355, 25 (June 1, 1973); also Id., 
Judgment, 29-36 (Feb. 21, 1975).   
123 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. 
India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 I.C.J. Rep. 142; Corfu Channel case (U.K. v. 
Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 104.  
124 See also Ciaran Cross & Christian Schliemann-Radbruch, When 
Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent Solutions through Amicus 
Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6  L & DEV. REV. 67, 87 (2013).  
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do. On the international plane this paper argues the IBR provides 
this overarching umbrella. The IBR sets out the paradigm in which 
states but also the arbitrators and the investors have to operate in. If 
states would not have to adhere to the IBR (and as stated at the 
beginning since those rights embodied in the IBR are customary so 
every state has to adhere to them) then human rights protection 
would be illusory. The IBR has to be treated as jus congens by any 
tribunal in investment treaties decisions. Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “a treaty is void if, 
at the time its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law.” The general principle that is extrapolated is 
that domestic as well as international law follows a hierarchy whereby 
treaty obligations are of no effect in the event that they conflict with 
a fundamental jus congens.125 The IBR contains  the most globally 
recognized norms. International investment law itself should not be 
blind to human rights.126 By signing an investment treaty states 
cannot relieve themselves from any human rights obligation towards 
their citizens. It should not matter whether the state includes human 
rights protection in those treaties or not. It cannot lie in the hands of 
the states or the investors whether human rights are applicable.127 
Regarding that international investment law constitutes a public law 
discipline128, neither states nor investors can “flee into private law”129 
                                                 
125 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 18 (International 
Institute for Sustainable Development Research Paper, Apr. 2004), 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
126 Filip Balcerzak, Jurisdiction of Tribunals in Investor–State Arbitration and the 
Issue of Human Rights, 29 ICSID Rev. 216, at VI (2016), 
https://academic.oup.com/icsidreview/article/29/1/216/2356645/Jurisdiction-
of-Tribunals-in-Investor-State (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
127 For a different opinion, see Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in Investor-
State Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and Beyond, 6 J. OF INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 277, 281 (2015), 
https://academic.oup.com/jids/article/6/2/277/819997/Human-Rights-in-
Investor-State-Arbitration-The (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017), who points out in his 
conclusion that the highest responsibility for human rights protection bears the 
state while building an investment treaty, even though he recognizes the possible 
influence of investment arbitration tribunals regardless of investment treaties 
clauses at least for the human right to water. 
128 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 17 et al. (2010). 
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when it comes to violation of basic general law principles.130 The 
ability of states to contract out, even partially, of the IBR would 
seriously undermine human rights protection globally. As set out 
above under B the IBR provides not only protection for citizens but 
also for the investor. And also the arbitrator is part of the paradigm 
as Lalive so clearly pointed out:131  
While he is clearly not an organ of the State, the 
international arbitrator is not acting in a legal vacuum 
and is not called upon to decide, so to speak, as if he 
did not belong to this world! The question may be 
raised here, in passing [ . . . ] whether the arbitrator is 
not, perhaps, the organ of the international 
community, be it the community of States or the 
‘international community of businessmen’ (in which 
more and more States and State organs appear to be 
active) or both international communities. 
The investor-state relationship illustrates the private-public 
divide on the international plane. The private-public divide, i.e. when 
is a state action private when public, is one of the most contested in 
every jurisdiction.132 One of the fundamental issues is that the 
                                                 
129 Compare the principle in German Public Law “keine Flucht ins 
Privatrecht”, see Ferdinand Kirchhof, Art. 83, n.103, in GRUNDGESETZ-
KOMMENTAR, 78 (Maunz & Dürig eds., Sept. 2016); Thorsten Kingreen, AEUV 
Art. 36, n.111, in EUV/AEUV 5 (Calliess & Ruffert eds., 2016). 
130 Compare Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of “General Principles” in the 
Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 295 (Apr., 1963) (“The 
science of international law can no longer be content with the analogous 
application of private law categories. It must search the entire body of the ‘general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ for proper analogies. With the 
growing importance of international legal relations between public authorities and 
private legal subjects, public law will be an increasingly fertile source of 
international law”). 
131 Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and 
International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN ARBITRATION, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 at 258, 302 (1986).  
132 For an overview of the German discussion, See Ulrich Stelkens, The 
Public-Private Divide: Annual Report – 2010 – Germany, IUS PUBLICUM 
NETWORK REV. (Nov. 2011), http://www.ius-
publicum.com/repository/uploads/23_11_2011_10_39_Stelkens.pdf (last accessed 
May 28, 2016), for an overview of the German discussion. For an overview of the 
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arbitration community seems to view the investor-state relationship 
from a private law lens centering its analysis of the relationship 
between in the investor and the state solely on the investment treaty. 
The investment treaty, a treaty between two or more states, does 
have to be the starting point of the analysis. The object of an 
investment treaty is to attract investment, i.e. business, something 
commonly associated with private law. However, only because the 
subject matter of the treaty is private does not mean that public law 
principles, i.e. human rights, do not apply to its interpretation. As the 
German Constitutional Court has convincingly and regularly stated: a 
state cannot resort to a private measure to circumvent its human 
rights commitments since otherwise human rights protection would 
be illusive.133 
To accept the proposed paradigm in this article would mean 
that human rights, as enshrined in the IBR, have to be taken into 
account by the arbitral tribunal whether or not there is an 
interpretative “hole” or “hook” in the respective investment treaty. 
Human rights are the structure in which the investment treaty is fixed 
to and which ultimately limits it. In other words, the paradigm 
proposed is the opposite paradigm of, what is at this stage, the 
general opinion where the investment treaty provides the structure in 
which human rights have to find a hook to be able to find hold in 
that structure. Thereby, while balancing the interests of the investor 
against the interests of the citizens, arbitrators not only harmonize 
two potentially conflicting regimes of international law (investment 
law and human rights law) but, in substance, also highlight the human 
dimension of investment law.134  
                                                 
discussion regarding the United Kingdom, see Dawn Oliver, common values in public 
and private law and the public/private divide, in BA Rider (ed), LAW AT THE CENTRE 119 
(Kluwer, London, 1999); see generally Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private 
Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT’’L LAW 387 (1999); LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE (2007).  
133 See BVerfGE 15, 256, 262; BVerfGE 21, 362, 369, 370; BVerfGE 115, 
205, 237. 
134 Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A 
Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 1107, 1114 (2011). 
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D. Conclusion 
An analysis of the international human rights framework 
demonstrates that states’ citizens as well as the foreign investors are 
human rights bearers. Human rights methodology provides for a 
balancing of conflicting rights’ positions.  The current inclusion of 
human rights into the decision making of arbitral tribunals occurs 
through an investment treaty centered interpretation. That general 
approach limits the tribunal’s ability, if not discourages, to consider 
the relevant human rights of citizens and investors alike in its 
decision-making. Arbitrators are part of the international community 
and their mandate is not only determined by their appointment and 
the relevant investment treaty provisions but also by the international 
constitutional framework, i.e. the applicable human rights norms. 
Even if an arbitral tribunal would ignore an exciting investment treaty 
a human rights analysis would not disregard the rights of the investor. 
Therefore, if a human rights analysis does not differ in its outcome 
significantly from the analyses of tribunals under the relevant 
investment treaty then it evidences that an arbitral tribunal does not 
have to fear the inclusion of a human rights analysis in its decision-
making process. On the contrary, an inclusion of a human rights 
analysis will aid the decision-making process and most importantly 
will foster a constructive dialogue with the human rights lobby and 
thereby would promote the legitimacy of investment arbitration.   
III. THE CASE 
Investors have successfully sought relief in front of regional 
human rights courts135 and domestic courts136 for government 
interference with their investment. An analysis in light of the 
international human rights framework adds an important dimension. 
                                                 
135 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) no. 170 (Nov. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last accessed 
May 10, 2016); Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 14902/04 (Mar. 8, 2012).  
136 See Overview in Helene Brubowski, Internationale 
Investionsschiedsverfahren und nationale Gerichte, Jus Internationale et Europaeum 79 
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2013).  
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As set out earlier the international human rights framework provides 
the global human rights standard available to every international 
arbitral tribunal by virtue of being international. It provides the 
globally accepted minimum human rights standard.  
The general way human rights cases are approached are by 
defining the ambit of the right that is potentially infringed and once 
an infringement is established to balance the limiting of that right 
with the rights of other rights holders since it is accepted that rights 
can be justifiably limited by the rights of others.  In the following that 
methodology will be applied to TECMED v Mexico.137 The tribunals 
approach in the judgement was also followed by other tribunals later 
on, for example, in Azurix v Argentina.138 
A. The Investment Arbitration Tribunal Decision  
TECMED, a Spanish company with its two Mexican 
subsidiaries, brought a claim against Mexico alleging several 
violations of the Spain-Mexico BIT. The claim concerned 
TECMED’s investment in a hazardous waste landfill site acquired in 
1996. TECMED alleged that Mexico failed to renew a license for the 
site. 
In the investment arbitration proceedings TECMED alleged 
the failure to renew the license rendered the investment completely 
lost, as it did not have any economic value as an ongoing business. 
TECMED alleged violations of the BIT, including expropriation, fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security. The tribunal 
found that Mexico’s action in effect expropriated TECMED’s 
investment, and that it failed to provide fair and equitable treatment. 
The Tribunal interestingly did balance Mexico’s interest in its 
                                                 
137 TECMED v Mexico, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003) 
(the author chose this case as one of the earlier cases where the arbitral tribunal 
payed regard to balancing the rights of the investor against the rights of Mexico’s 
citizens).  
138 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Award of July 14, 2006, para. 311, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0061.pdf (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017). 
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environment and the investor’s right to property. The Tribunal 
stated:139 
After establishing that regulatory actions and 
measures will not be initially excluded from the 
definition of expropriatory acts, in addition to the 
negative financial impact of such actions or measures, 
the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to 
determine if they are to be characterized as 
expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are 
proportional to the public interest presumably 
protected thereby and to the protection legally 
granted to investments, taking into account that the 
significance of such impact has a key role upon 
deciding the proportionality. Although the analysis 
starts at the due deference owing to the State when 
defining the issues that affect its public policy or the 
interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions 
that will be implemented to protect such values, such 
situation does not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal, 
without thereby questioning such due deference, from 
examining the actions of the State in light of Article 
5(1) of the Agreement to determine whether such 
measures are reasonable with respect to their goals, 
the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate 
expectations of who suffered such deprivation. There 
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign 
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any 
expropriatory measure. To value such charge or 
weight, it is very important to measure the size of the 
ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the 
state and whether such deprivation was compensated 
or not. On the basis of a number of legal and practical 
factors, it should be also considered that the foreign 
                                                 
139 TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 122. Also recently 
quoted in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/10/7, para. 295 
(July 8, 2016), where it stressed that the tribunal relied on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, based on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the 
Convention.. 
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investor has a reduced or nil participation in the 
taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because 
the investors are not entitle to exercise political rights 
reserved to the nationals of the State, such as voting 
for the authorities that will issue the decisions that 
affect such investors. 
B. The Human Rights Tribunal Decision  
This paper will limit its human rights analysis to the right to 
property.  
 1. Ambit of the right infringed? 
The first step in a human rights analysis is to define the ambit 
of the right that is potentially involved to determine whether the act 
or omission is protected by the right. As discussed under II.B.2.(ii). 
the right to property encompasses a license140 as well as legitimate 
expectations in proprietary positions141 In TECMED the investor 
sustained a complete loss of the profits and income from the 
economic and commercial operation of the landfill as an ongoing 
business. The damage sustained included the impossibility of 
recovering the cost incurred in the acquisition of assets for the 
landfill, its adaptation and preparation and, more generally, the 
investments relating to or required for this kind of industrial activity. 
That included, but was not limited to, constructions relating to the 
landfill; lost profits and business opportunities; the impossibility of 
performing contracts entered into with entities producing industrial 
waste. Thus the government’s action lead to the termination of such 
contracts and to possible claims relating thereto. Furthermore, the 
government’s action resulted in a loss of reputation for TECMED 
                                                 
140 Compare Tre Traktörer ABGaramond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. 
No. 10873/84, para. 53 (1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 
12033/86 (1991); Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96 (1999). 
141 Compare Slivenko v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99 (2003), 
para. 121; see also Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.  8919/80 
(ser. A), para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd.  v. Ireland, 222 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) (1991). 
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and to its subsidiaries in Mexico. The consequence was a negative 
impact on TECMED’s capacity to expand and develop its activities 
in Mexico. Even though the government did not expropriate 
TECMED its actions rendered the property of TECMED de facto 
useless. In addition, TECMED’s expectation in the license and the 
license itself are protected by the right to property. Therefore, 
TECMED’s activities and expectations in regard to the operation of 
the landfill were protected by the customary right to property.  
TECMED’s right to its property was infringed by the actions of 
Mexico’s government. As set out above under II.B.2.(ii). the right to 
property can be limited if the property owner is compensated fairly 
for the expropriation.142 If the state compensates fairly for the 
expropriation the right to property is not infringed.  
 2. Proportionality Analysis  
After establishing that TECMED’s right to property in the 
landfill was infringed through the government’s action the next 
inquiry is whether the government’s action is a justified limitation on 
TECMED’s right to property. That inquiry is particularly fact 
specific. Since the arbitral tribunal did not engage in a human rights 
analysis the government did not provide the facts to the standard 
needed for a proportionality analysis according to the record. The 
analysis is limited to the facts set out in the award.  
(i) Is there a Legitimate Aim in Regard to the Measure in Question?  
As set out under II.A. the right to health is a right protected 
by ICESCR which the state has to progressively realize.  The 
Tribunal itself observed that: 
the Arbitral Tribunal has to resolve any dispute 
submitted to it by applying international law 
                                                 
142 What constitutes a “fair”, “just”, or “reasonable” compensation is of 
course a matter of contention. It is beyond the scope of this article. For further 
reading in regard to the ECtHR: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European 
Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations of the 
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J,., 148, 165 et seq. (2002). 
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provisions (Title VI.1 of the Appendix to the 
Agreement), for which purpose the Arbitral Tribunal 
understands that disputes are to be resolved by 
resorting to the sources described in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice 
considered, also in the case of customary international 
law, not as frozen in time, but in their evolution.143 
Interestingly, the Tribunal only applied international law and 
customary international law in regard to its understanding of the right 
to property and the question whether indirect de facto expropriation 
amounted to expropriation. It did not discuss international law or 
customary international law applicable to the citizens of Mexico. 
Instead the tribunal found that it was not concerned with whether 
non-renewal of the permit was legal under domestic law. It held:144 
The Arbitral Tribunal will not review the grounds or 
motives of the Resolution in order to determine 
whether it could be or was legally issued. However, it 
must consider such matters to determine if the 
Agreement was violated. That the actions of the 
Respondent are legitimate or lawful or in compliance 
with the law from the standpoint of the Respondent’s 
domestic laws does not mean that they conform to 
the Agreement or to international law. 
Even if the Tribunal is correct by not reviewing the legality of 
the non-renewal of the permit under domestic law the Tribunal in 
accordance with its own reliance on Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice has to take into account the 
international law and the international customary law applicable to 
the citizens of the state.  
The state is obligated under Article 12 ICESCR to safeguard 
and to progressively realise the highest attainable standard of the 
health of its citizens. To protect its citizens from the health effects of 
                                                 
143 TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 116 n.133 (May 29, 
2003) (citing Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case no. ARB (AF)/99/2, 
para. 116 (Oct. 11, 2002)). 
144 Id. at para. 120. 
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hazardous waste is an obvious obligation. The denial to renew a 
permit for a landfill where hazardous waste is deposited due to the 
urbanisation of the area is a measure that is in accordance with the 
state’s duty to safeguard its citizens’ health and an aim the state is 
under an international obligation to realise.  
(ii) Is the Measure Suitable to Achieve the Aim?  
On the available facts the closure and relocation of the 
landfill is a suitable measure to avoid a hazard for the citizens of the 
close by urban centre. The municipality’s motivation was stated 
as:145“[to] secure environmental safety in view of the rapid urban 
growth of Hermosillo, provide a response to the concerns that had 
been expressed and guarantee,  in the long term, the environmental 
infrastructure to handle and dispose of industrial waste”.  
(iii) Is the Measure Necessary to Achieve the Aim?  
The facts indicate that TECMED operated the landfill in 
accordance with all safety regulations and that the operation and even 
a proposed extension of the operation did not and would not 
threaten the public health of the citizens of the nearby town or the 
environment.146 Therefore the non-renewal of the permit was not 
necessary to achieve the aim of safeguarding the citizens of 
Hermosillo from a public health threat and environmental disaster. 
However, it can be argued that a landfill that contains hazardous 
waste even if compliant with all safety regulations poses an inherent 
threat to the health of a nearby urban centre. By closing landfills 
containing hazardous waste close to urban centres is a preventative 
measure progressively realizing the right to health under Article 12 
ICESCR.  
                                                 
145 Id. at para. 110. 
146 Id. at para. 131.  
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(iv) Is the Measure the Least Rights Infringing Means to Achieve the 
Aim? 
If the non-renewal of the license is the only measure suitable 
to prevent a health threat to the citizens of the nearby urban centre. 
It has to be borne in mind, that the need to dispose of hazardous 
waste is a necessary by-product of modern civilisation. Therefore, the 
state would potentially breach its obligations under Article 12 
ICESCR by closing one landfill where hazardous waste can be 
disposed of without allowing for the hazardous waste to be disposed 
of somewhere else since it would risk the illegal dumping of 
hazardous waste.  With that in mind the question arises whether the 
blanket non-renewal of the license is the least infringing measure or 
whether the non-renewal of the license accompanied with either 
compensation for the loss of the business and/or the offer of a 
different site to resume TECMED’s business would have been a least 
infringing measure. According to the facts, it is worthy to note that 
negotiations in regard to relocating TECMED’s business to a 
different site had taken place during and after the non-renewal of the 
perm it but had ultimately ceased.147 The least infringing measure in 
regard to TECMED’s property interest would have been to either 
offer a new site for its operation or adequately compensate them for 
its loss of business. As noted above, II.B.3. (especially footnote 92), 
the right to property has the inherit limitation that generally 
expropriation has to be accompanied with fair compensation to be 
justified. Even though the facts are silent on the issue it seems that 
for the state to fulfil its obligation under ICESCR and its obligation 
towards TECMED the least infringing measure would have been to 
offer an alternative site for TECMED’s operation. However, it is 
acknowledged that the state can make choices in how to realize its 
obligations. Therefore, the state instead of relocating TECMED’s 
business could have compensated TECMED for its loss of property 
and organised the disposal of hazardous waste differently. By not 
doing either the state did not use the least infringing measure to 
achieve its aim. The non-renewal of the permit without either fair 
compensation or re-location of TECMED’s business is therefore 
disproportionate to the state’s aim to safeguard the health of its 
citizens. It is an justified limit on TECMED’s right to property.  
                                                 
147 Id. at para. 112. 
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(v) Considering the competing interests of the different rights bearers at 
hand is the measure proportional? 
Since the non-renewal of the licence is not the least infringing 
measure available to the state TECMED’s right to property is 
disproportionally limited in balance with the citizens’ right to health.  
 3. Conclusion 
Using a human rights methodology to analyze TECMED’s 
claim against Mexico in regard to the expropriation of its business 
demonstrates that a human rights analysis will take the rights of the 
investor into account. A human rights analysis will provide for an 
analytical framework that will allow a tribunal to balance the rights of 
the investor with that of the state’s citizens. The use of a human 
rights framework will lead to more fully developed arguments under 
international law. It is significant that in TECMED the Tribunal 
relied on Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice in regard to the investor but not in regard to the state’s 
citizens. Using the human rights framework in aiding its decision 
tribunals would combat what, commentators generally agree, that 
international investment law and arbitration have an adverse impact 
on the promotion and protection of human rights.148 
Having established a breach of the investor’s right to 
property the question becomes what the appropriate remedy for a 
breach of the human rights violation is. The question of 
compensation is without doubt of utmost importance for the victims 
                                                 
148 See Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights 
Enforcement and Realization 2 (N.Y.U. Global Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2005). 
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of human rights abuses.149 In regard to the violation of the right to 
property the ECtHR has generally held that:150  
the protection of the right to property … would be 
largely illusory and ineffective in the absence of any 
equivalent principle. Clearly, compensation terms are 
material to the assessment whether the contested 
legislation respects a fair balance between the various 
interests at stake and, notably, whether it does not 
impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant. 
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that using a human 
rights framework to analyze an investor-state dispute will adequately 
address the rights of the investor and the state’s citizens. Using a 
human rights methodology will aid a tribunal’s analysis of the dispute 
and will contribute to the legitimacy of its decision. The question of a 
fair remedy is outside the scope of this paper.  
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
There is no need for an arbitral tribunal in an investor-state 
dispute to have any “Berührungsängste” in regard to human rights. 
International human rights do provide a methodological framework 
that allows for a balanced consideration of both the investor’s 
position but also the respective state’s citizens’ rights which the state 
has to safeguard and/or progressively implement. The investor’s right 
to property which is at the center of the contention is not an isolated 
                                                 
149 See, e.g., DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW (2015); EWA BGINSKA, DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (Springer, 
Heidelberg, 2015); JASON VARUHAS, DAMAGES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Hart, 2016); 
JAGMOHAN MISHRA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION: CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS & 
REMEDIES (Akansha Publishing, 2011); see also G.A. Res. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).  
150 James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 54 (1986); 
see also Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 120 (1986); 
Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 70-75 (1994); 
Hentrich v France, 209-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1994); Pressos Compania 
Naviera SA v. Belgium, A332 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 38 (1995); Guillemin v. 
France, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 52-57 (1997). 
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right but a right which is instrumental, in the company with other 
rights, in fostering socio-economic well-being151 Only the interplay 
and inclusion of all members of a society, natural and legal persons, 
nationals or foreigners, can society strive and attain the highest 
possible standard of well-being. The international human rights 
framework recognizes this and has tasked the state with the duty 
through fair and reasonable government, i.e. through balancing the 
rights of every member of society, to progressively achieve the 
highest possible standard of well-being.  
An international arbitral tribunal, as part of the international 
community, is charged with overseeing whether the state has 
balanced the rights at play justifiably. In essence, there can be no 
doubt that the state has to be able to take any measure which 
enhances the human rights of its citizens or safeguards them from 
harm. If that measure infringes the rights of the investor the measure 
will be justified if the investor is compensated. In other words, the 
state can do anything as long as it compensates the investor. There 
might be situations where the measure is of such importance that in 
balance the property infringement of the investor does not warrant 
compensation.152  
For an investment tribunal to include a human rights analysis 
into its decision-making process will increase its legitimacy. Even 
though desirable, there is no need for stronger human rights clauses 
in investment treaties. The investment tribunals bear the 
responsibility to implement the law, regardless whether states and 
investors felt before responsible for including a human rights clause 
in their investment treaties. Since human rights provide the 
overarching framework any investment treaty, bi-lateral or multi-
lateral, has to be interpreted in light of human rights and is limited by 
them. Accordingly, also lawyers should be aware that they enjoy the 
opportunity to introduce human rights considerations into the 
arbitral conversation153, as already mentioned no matter for which 
                                                 
151 Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as well 
as in association with others, para. 116, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993). 
152 As noted earlier, it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss what 
constitutes fair compensation.  
153 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 20 (International 
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side they argue. Then red riding hood and the wolf may have a break 
from playing tag and come more often together for a cup of tea on 
eye level. 
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